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Abstract
The hypothesis of a Hierarchy of the Sciences, first formulated in the 19th century, predicts that, moving from simple and
general phenomena (e.g. particle dynamics) to complex and particular (e.g. human behaviour), researchers lose ability to
reach theoretical and methodological consensus. This hypothesis places each field of research along a continuum of
complexity and ‘‘softness’’, with profound implications for our understanding of scientific knowledge. Today, however, the
idea is still unproven and philosophically overlooked, too often confused with simplistic dichotomies that contrast natural
and social sciences, or science and the humanities. Empirical tests of the hypothesis have usually compared few fields and
this, combined with other limitations, makes their results contradictory and inconclusive. We verified whether discipline
characteristics reflect a hierarchy, a dichotomy or neither, by sampling nearly 29,000 papers published contemporaneously
in 12 disciplines and measuring a set of parameters hypothesised to reflect theoretical and methodological consensus. The
biological sciences had in most cases intermediate values between the physical and the social, with bio-molecular
disciplines appearing harder than zoology, botany or ecology. In multivariable analyses, most of these parameters were
independent predictors of the hierarchy, even when mathematics and the humanities were included. These results support
a ‘‘gradualist’’ view of scientific knowledge, suggesting that the Hierarchy of the Sciences provides the best rational
framework to understand disciplines’ diversity. A deeper grasp of the relationship between subject matter’s complexity and
consensus could have profound implications for how we interpret, publish, popularize and administer scientific research.
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Introduction
Positivist philosopher Auguste Comte (1798–1857) first pro-
posed a ‘‘natural’’ ordering of scientific disciplines based on
generality of subject matter [1,2]. From mathematics to sociology,
his Hierarchy of the Sciences (HOS) was intended to reflect the
growing complexity, inter-dependence, and vicinity to human
passions of research fields, all of which determined their level of
development as sciences. This idea was abandoned by post-
positivist thinking, who increasingly emphasised the irrational side
of scientific progress [3,4], leading to the extreme opposite view
that disciplines are an unordered product of historical and cultural
contingencies, similar to political or artistic currents [5]. Today,
concepts like ‘‘hard’’ and ‘‘soft’’ science are used in a vague,
confused sense, and their imputation to specific research fields is
felt to be controversial if not offensive. This might be a costly
mistake, because these concepts seem to capture an essential
feature of science, and have important implications that today tend
to be ignored.
What do we mean by ‘‘hard’’ science? Scholars have treated the
topic from a multitude of angles (see [6,7,8]), but all definitions
seem to converge on the concept of consensus – consensus, for
example, ‘‘on the significance of new knowledge and the
continuing relevance of old’’ [9,10,11,12]. In an ideal science,
scholars share a common background of established theories, facts
and methods. This allows them to agree (usually after debate and
further evidence) on the validity and significance of a new research
finding, making it the basis for further theorizing and research.
Harder sciences are hypothesised to come closer to this ideal.
Moving towards ‘‘softer’’ fields, this consensus becomes less likely
to be reached, the common background shrinks and fractures, and
so data become less able to ‘‘speak for themselves’’ [6]. Already in
Comte’s intuition, this happened primarily because of the
increasing complexity of subject matters.
What do we mean by complexity? The exact definition is still
debated in complexity science itself, and so are its possible
measures [13,14]. In very general terms, however, the complexity
of a system is linked to the number of elements involved, their
diversity, the number and non-linearity of interactions between
them, the cohesiveness of internal versus external relationships
(which determines how isolated the system is), the distance from
thermodynamic equilibrium [15]. Complex systems require longer
(uncompressible) descriptions and are less predictable in their
behaviour [16,17]. Clearly, the systems studied by individual
disciplines vary widely in these characteristics. It is also clear,
however, that complexity generally increases with increasing levels
of organization of matter. From subatomic particles to human
societies, there is an overall increase in the possible number of
elements, combinations, interactions etc. the phenomenon of
emergence might bring relative simplicity at higher levels, but the
overall trend is for complexity to increase [16,17]. And whilst
phenomena get more complex, our ability to study them
decreases. Objects of investigation become more difficult to isolate
and describe, and are more diversified in space and time (e.g.
[18,19,20]). Due to technical, practical and ethical considerations,
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experiments and predictions are replaced by observations and
accommodations, which are arguably a less powerful and reliable
sources of knowledge [21,22,23,24]. These limits make replication
less likely to be attempted and to be successful [25]. Moreover, the
growing diversity and contingency of studied phenomena leads to
a dispersion of research funding and efforts, further reducing the
potential to reach conclusive evidence and settle intellectual
debates (see e.g. [20]).
The fundamental prediction made by a modern version of the
HOS, therefore, is that the ability of a scientific field to achieve
consensus and accumulate knowledge will decrease when moving
from the physical, to the biological, to the social sciences. The
same prediction should hold, of course, at finer levels of analysis,
and we would expect that, within each domain, individual
disciplines, fields and subfields vary significantly in their level of
softness. However, since we lack objective methods to measure and
rank complexity at such levels, finer-grained tests would be
inaccurate. How mathematics and the humanities fit into the HOS
is rather unclear. In Comte’s scheme, the humanities were
excluded whilst mathematics was the basis of the hierarchy. The
predictions developed here, however, are based on the assumption
that disciplinary practices are constrained by physical properties of
subject matter. Both mathematics and the humanities have purely
intellectual subject matters, and therefore technically lack any
physical constraint. On the other hand, these two disciplines are
arguably at the extremes of a spectrum of consensus-reaching
potential, and will therefore be included in a secondary test.
The HOS prediction stands in contrast with two alternatives
philosophical positions. The first, very common amongst academ-
ics as well as lay-people, draws a fundamental distinction between
natural and social sciences (i.e. sociology, psychology, etc.), and
uses the term ‘‘soft science’’ to indicate the latter. Alternatively, the
term ‘‘soft’’ is used to distinguish qualitative research or historical-
philosophical studies (e.g. [26,27,28]). Reflecting a more general
divide in Western culture [29,30], this dichotomy can be traced
back to another long-standing debate, between those who see the
study of human behaviour akin to any other science, i.e. aimed at
discovering general patterns and laws, and those who believe it
should focus on individuality and on the meaning that people
ascribe to their world and actions [31]. In principle, of course, the
two purposes are not mutually exclusive, but many scholars in the
social sciences and humanities maintain that consciousness, free
will and socio-cultural life make human beings a completely
different subject matter from those of the natural sciences
[32,33,34,35,36]. The second alternative hypothesis, also very
common in academia and popular culture, denies any order at all.
Disciplines, under this view, deal with different phenomena and
produce different kinds of knowledge, so they cannot be compared
in any meaningful way – let alone be ranked (see [6,37]). In its
more radical forms, this view explicitly denies the existence of a
hierarchy, and replaces it by a ‘‘disordered’’ view of knowledge, in
which the sciences only superficially resemble each other (e.g.
[38,39]).
The HOS hypothesis can therefore be readily contrasted with,
on the one hand, a dichotomy hypothesis (which we will call ‘‘two
cultures’’) and, on the other hand, a null hypothesis, in which there
is no particular order. Key to distinguishing these predictions are
the biological sciences, which should fall in-between the physical
and the social only according to the HOS (Figure 1).
Innumerable studies have proposed and applied measures of
hardness and consensus, and reviewing them all would be beyond
the scope of this paper (see [6,7,8]). These studies reached different
conclusions, and so did their reviews. Analyses on peer review
agreement on National Science Foundation grant applications,
together with other evidence, led Cole (1983) to conclude that the
HOS is at least partly a myth. Hard disciplines like physics, Cole
argued, do appear to have a larger and more solid ‘‘core’’ of
knowledge, manifest in the consistency of university textbooks; but
at the research ‘‘front’’, where science is actually done, consensus
is equally low for all disciplines [10,11,40]. A later quantitative
review, however, combined these and other empirical results and
found evidence of a straightforward hierarchy [12,41]. These
contradictions are largely a consequence of methodological
limitations, many of which were noted long ago [42]: most
empirical studies to date have compared only one or two natural
sciences (e.g. physics or molecular biology) with one or two social
(usually sociology or psychology); instead of drawing representative
samples, these studies focused on a few journals or specific
subfields, choosing different ones every time; moreover, sample
sizes in these studies are usually small, and there are remarkably
few purely ‘‘null’’ results in the literature, which could suggest the
presence of publication bias [43]. Narrative and quantitative
reviews suffer form the limitations of their primary evidence,
which makes their results inconclusive in turn.
Methodological biases can be avoided by using objective
measures, and sociological studies of science are advancing rapidly
thanks to the availability of ever more refined bibliometric data
[44]. Recent studies claimed to have captured differences in
consensus by looking at characteristics and networks of references
[45,46,47,48]. These studies, however, suffer from the confusion
and limitations mentioned above, leaving the HOS and its
alternatives inconclusively tested. Large cross-disciplinary studies,
on the other hand, have repeatedly observed a correlation between
the prevalence and growth of publication bias and putative
softness, at least in non-applied research [6,49,50]. This suggests
that there is something fundamentally true about the HOS
hypothesis, with potentially important implications for how we
view, publish and manage science.
This study aimed at assessing conclusively whether measurable
characteristics of papers differ in ways predicted by the HOS or
competing hypotheses. We sampled nearly 29,000 papers
published at the beginning of 2012 in journals that Thomson
Reuters’ Essential Science Indicators (ESI) database classified in 12
non-applied disciplines, and measured a set of objective param-
eters that, in previous independent studies, had been theoretically
connected to consensus and/or that had been shown to distinguish
the social from the natural sciences. These parameters are:
number of authors, length of article, number of cited references,
proportion of books in references, age of references, diversity of
cited sources, relative title length, use of first person in abstracts
and likelihood to share references with other papers in the sample.
Table 1 summarizes predictions for each of these parameters,
Figure 1. Alternative predictions tested in this study, about
how scientific domains should differ in any measure of
hardness (or, equivalently, consensus. m = mathematics; p =
physical sciences; b = biological sc.; s = social sc.; h =
humanities). Predictions are explicit about empirical sciences, whilst
mathematics and the humanities are tested secondarily.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066938.g001
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whilst further explanations and details on measurement are given
in the Methods section.
In what we define as the ‘‘main test’’, we assessed how the
biological sciences compare to the physical and the social – the
basic prediction being that the former should have intermediate
characteristics between the latter two. To make this test more
balanced and powerful, we sub-grouped the four ESI biological
disciplines in two harder and two softer, under the prediction that
the latter should fall between the former and the social sciences.
We also run an ‘‘extended test’’, to assess whether mathematics
and the humanities match intuitive predictions, and finally present
data disaggregated by ESI discipline.
Methods
Sampling
We sampled research articles from journals covered by
Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science database, assigned by the
Essential Science Indicators scheme to the categories of: Mathe-
matics, Space Science, Physics, Chemistry, Molecular Biology,
Biology & Biochemistry, Plant and Animal Sciences, Environ-
ment/Ecology, Psychiatry/Psychology, Economics & Business,
Social Sciences General, and Humanities (this latter identified with
journals listed in the Arts & Humanities Citation Index). These
categories cover basic (non-applied) research, which is where
predictions of the HOS apply [1,6]. To truly capture the research
frontier, we selected the ‘‘first generation’’ of papers published in
2012 (i.e. published in their journal’s first 2012 issue and/or in
January), obtaining a final sample of 28,893 papers, of which
Table 1. Summary of predictions.
parameter pred. effects of higher consensus: Key refs.
number of authors + greater scope and need for collaboration [9,44]
nength of article 2 less need to introduce, justify and explain study [47,52]
number of references 2 less need to justify, explain and support study [47]
references to monographs 2 focus on simpler questions; less need to justify, explain and support study [53,54]
age of references 2 faster settling of disagreements; greater potential to build research upon previous
findings
[44,56]
diversity of sources 2 fewer research topics, which are of more general interest [47,57]
relative title length + clearly defined, substantive research questions [52,58]
use of first person
(singular vs. plural)
2 universal validity of claims; less scope for argumentation; fewer appeals to opinion
and authority
[59]
sharing of references degree 2 clustering of studies around clearly defined, separate questions; less need to cite
older and general literature
[45,47,48]
intensity +
Predicted correlation of each bibliometric parameter with a field’s level of scholarly consensus brief explanation of hypothesised causal mechanism, and studies from
which the predictions were derived. Extensive explanations for each parameter are given in the Methods section.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066938.t001
Figure 2. Paper characteristics hypothesised to reflect the level of consensus, by scientific domain. Domains are attributed based on
journal, following the classifications of Essential Science Indicators and Arts & Humanities Science Citation Index: m = mathematics; p = physical
sciences (Space Sc.+ Physics + Chemistry); bh = biological-hard sciences (Molecular Biology + Biology & Biochemistry); bs = biological-soft sciences
(Plant and Animal Sc. + Environment/Ecology); s = social sciences (Psychiatry/Psychology + Economics & Business + Social Sciences, General); h =
humanities. [Data sourced from Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066938.g002
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28,477 had a non-empty references list – covering over 1,140,000
references in total. Based on theory and a preliminary study [51]
we focused on the following measures.
Number of authors. Research teams are almost by defini-
tion built around a consensus on objectives and methods.
Moreover, the ability to study a problem with greater accuracy
and detail leads to a specialization of roles, making collaboration
essential [9]. The hardness of a field, therefore, should be manifest
in the size of its research teams. Alternative arguments would
suggest that team size is a consequence of funding availability,
rather than consensus per se [44].
Table 2. Main and extended test, all parameters combined.
main test extended test
predictor b±se z b±se z
ln(n. authors) 20.43360.010 242.83 20.08860.009 29.508
Price’s index 20.40460.029 213.932 20.06960.026 22.655
sqrt(Shannon diversity of sources) 0.08260.001 42.443 0.11060.001 63.688
proportion of cited monographs 6.62660.054 121.222 7.50560.045 165.223
ln(1+n. pages) 0.89960.021 41.514 0.59660.019 30.991
ln(relative title length) 20.11860.015 27.56 0.21860.014 15.561
1st pers. singular 12.2362.333 5.245 12.3261.568 7.854
1st pers. plural 222.2161.182 218.787 267.4460.771 287.429
single vs. multi-author dummy 20.09660.013 27.147 20.30360.011 226.895
ln(1+sharing degree) 0.22760.003 58.566 0.25260.003 70.329
ln(1+sharing intensity) 20.41860.020 220.482 20.38260.017 221.786
1st pers. singular *(sing vs. multi author) 227.7862.332 211.912 217.7461.568 211.312
1st pers. plural*(sing vs. multi author) 16.6161.179 14.088 41.1460.757 54.34
Multiple ordinal regression assessing how parameters hypothesised to reflect consensus predict a rank order of scientific domains (main test: I-physical, II-biological-
hard, III-biological-soft, IV-social sciences; extended test: same as main, with mathematics and humanities at the two ends). For details on each parameter, see
introduction and methods. Use of first person pronouns was measured through an interaction term with a dummy variable separating single and multi-authored papers
– the main effects for these latter two are retained to ensure a hierarchically well-formulated model. [Data sourced from Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066938.t002
Figure 3. Bibliographic coupling network of papers, partitioned by scientific domain (total N=28,477; yellow = mathematics; blue
= physical sciences; darker green = biological-hard sc.; lighter green = biological-soft sc.; red = social sc.; purple = humanities).
Panel A: probabilities to share a given number of references with any other paper in the sample, estimated by exponential random graph modelling.
The model controlled for number of references cited by each paper, number of triangles and edges. Error bars are 95% Confidence Intervals, bh is the
reference category, and has therefore all values set to zero. Panel B: network of shared references, in Yifan Hu Proportional layout. Panel C: network
partitioned by domain, with average degree, modularity and average path length. [Data sourced from Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066938.g003
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Length of article. When consensus is lower, papers must put
greater efforts in describing the background, justify their rationale
and approach, back up their claims and extensively discuss their
findings [47,52]. Longer introductions, and generally longer
papers, should therefore characterize softer research. We mea-
sured the total number of pages.
Number of references. For reasons similar to those that
make an article longer, references to previous literature should also
be more numerous in low-consensus fields [47].
References to monographs. Scholars in the humanities and
social sciences still frequently choose to publish books rather than
papers. This could be the effect of tradition, or of the greater
amount of space needed to analyse complex phenomena. Previous
studies have observed higher citations to monographs in the social
sciences, and intermediate values in at least some biological
disciplines [53,54]. These studies classified references using rules of
thumb, whose error rate can be quite high [54]. To obtain a more
precise measure, we combined these rules of thumb with
automatic searches in Google-Books and in text lists of journal
titles. Searches in Google-Books that returned valid results were
classified as monographs. Source titles that matched journal lists,
and references that included volume and page number were
classified as journal articles, the rest was hand-classified as either of
the above or as ‘‘other’’ (a category that included conference
proceedings and thesis, but which was then not actually used in
these analyses). Uncertain attributions (lacking most information
and having ambiguous titles) were classified as monographs –
therefore, the data presented here are an upper estimate of the
proportion of books. However, classifying uncertain items as any
other category yielded substantially similar results.
Age of references. Having noted that some sciences ‘‘me-
tabolize’’ the literature more rapidly, Derek de Solla Price
proposed an index, which measures the proportion of cited
references published in the five years preceding the citing paper
[44]. This index was repeatedly shown to distinguish the social and
natural sciences, and is therefore considered the measure of
hardness (e.g. [55]). Much attention is still paid to this parameter
(e.g. [56]), yet no study assessed how accurately it reflects the
Figure 4. Estimates of regression analyses with, as dependent variable parameters hypothesised to reflect consensus and, as
independent variables, scientific domains, weighted or corrected as described. Bars are 95% confidence intervals, and lines are added to
help visualize trends, with solid and dotted lines representing, respectively, main and extended test. Physical sciences are the reference category, and
therefore have values set to zero. m=mathematics; bh = hard-biological disciplines (Molecular Biology + Biology & Biochemistry); bs = soft-biological
disciplines (Plant and Animal Sciences + Environment/Ecology); s = social sciences (Psychiatry/Psychology+Economics & Business+Social Sciences,
general), h = humanities. See methods for further details on Methods section, and for the exact regression results with standard error see Table S1.
[Data sourced from Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066938.g004
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HOS. In a preliminary study, we compared this index to other
measures [51], and Price’s index emerged as equally powerful and
computationally simpler. For monographs, which tend to be cited
in their later editions, we used the oldest year returned by Google-
Books search (see above).
Diversity of sources. When scholars agree on the relative
importance of scientific problems, their efforts will concentrate in
specific fields and their findings will be of more general interest,
leading to a greater concentration of the relevant literature in few,
high-ranking outlets. From harder to softer fields, therefore, we
predict a growing diversity of sources of information [47]. Our
preliminary study tried different diversity measures – concluding
in favour of Shannon’s diversity index, in agreement with
independent studies [57]. We also tried limiting this measure to
journals alone, finding little substantial differences in the results.
Here we measured the Shannon diversity of all cited sources (titles
of journals, conferences, books, etc.…)
Relative title length. Linguistic analyses of scientific papers
noted that the number of substantive words in titles tended to be
longer and to correlate with an article’s total length in harder fields
[52,58]. This was interpreted as reflecting the greater empirical
focus and efficiency of high-consensus fields, but the evidence was
deemed too limited to draw firm conclusions. We measured the
total number of words, divided by total number of pages.
Use of first person. Scientists aim at making universal
claims, and their style of writing tends to be as impersonal as
possible. In the humanities, on the other hand, the emphasis tends
to be on originality, individuality and argumentation, which makes
the use of first person more common [59]. We therefore
hypothesised that the hierarchy of the sciences could reflect the
frequency of use of personal pronouns. Of all parameters in the
study, this is the one less directly linked to consensus and
complexity of subject matter, and more likely to be determined by
tradition, disciplinary convention, or journal style recommenda-
tions. We calculated the proportion of first person pronouns, both
singular and plural (i.e. ‘‘I’’, ‘‘me’’, ‘‘mine’’, ‘‘we’’, ‘‘our’’ etc.)
among all words in the abstract. Our main prediction was that
authors would under-use personal pronouns in harder sciences.
We created a dummy variable separating single- and multi-
authored papers, giving them values of -1 and 1, respectively.
Greater use of singular pronouns in single-authored papers would
be revealed by a negative value of the interaction term, whilst
greater use of plural pronouns by a positive one. In the figures (e.g.
Figure 2) we give prominence to the use of first person, due to
limitations of space.
Sharing of references. Authors that cite a common litera-
ture almost by definition are exhibiting a common cognitive
background. The sharing of references between papers, therefore,
Figure 5. Paper characteristics hypothesised to reflect the level of consensus, by scientific discipline. Classification is based on journal,
following the systems of Essential Science Indicators and Arts & Humanities Science Citation Index: ma = mathematics; sp = Space Science; ph=
Physics; ch = Chemistry; mb = Molecular Biology; bb = Biology & Biochemistry; pa = Plant and Animal Sciences; ee = Environment/Ecology; pp =
Psychiatry/Psychology; eb = Economics & Business; so = Social Sciences, General; ah = Arts & Humanities. [Data sourced from Thomson Reuters
Web of Knowledge].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066938.g005
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is perhaps the most direct expression of scholarly consensus. Of the
various techniques available to analyse citation networks, the most
likely to reflect this parameter is bibliographic coupling, in which a
network link is draw between two papers that cite the same
reference [46,60,61].
Recent studies using this approach suggested that: 1-papers
published in special issues in the natural sciences had more
references in common, whilst the social sciences shared older
references [47]; 2-shared references are more unequally distrib-
uted in physics compared to psychology [45]; 3-citation networks
of biophysics show greater coherence and less semantic fragmen-
tation than in economics and sociology [48]. In addition to general
limitations noted in the Introduction to this paper, most
bibliographic coupling studies sampled papers across multiple
years. Doing this might introduce a confounding factor, because
earlier papers might inspire themes and references to authors of
later papers. True scholarly consensus is maximally expressed
when two scholars cite the same literature without knowing of each
other’s work. To try to capture this effect, we sampled papers that
were published almost simultaneously (i.e. January 2012 and/or
first issue of the year).
We determined whether any two papers in the sample shared
one or more cited references, independent of discipline. To reduce
errors, references were initially compared using the DOI number
and, if this was unavailable, by using a string that included author,
year and source (i.e. ignoring volume and page information, which
are less reliable). Harder sciences are expected to share more
references, at least amongst the recent literature, but also to show a
greater focus on several specific problems, leading to an overall
greater clustering of the network. In other words, they are
predicted to share a greater number of references with fewer other
papers.
Harder sciences would also be predicted to share more recent
literature [47]. We initially attempted to partition the network by
age of references (i.e. above and below median age in each paper),
finding a greater sharing of older literature in the social sciences, as
expected. However, since disciplines differ in the average age of
cited references, what was classified as ‘‘old’’ in one paper was
sometimes classified as ‘‘new’’ in another, making this operation
dubious. Therefore, we chose not to partition references by age,
and limited analyses to the overall number of connections between
papers (i.e. node degree, which we will call ‘‘sharing degree’’, or
‘‘degree’’ for brevity), the number of references shared between
each (i.e. weight of edges, which we averaged across all edges of a
node obtaining what we call ‘‘sharing intensity’’), and overall
structure characteristics of the network (i.e. density, modularity
etc.).
Statistical analyses
For each bibliographic parameter, we tested predictions twice:
once excluding and once including mathematics (we will call these
‘‘basic’’ and ‘‘extended’’ tests). To make the tests more accurate,
we split the biological sciences between two ESI categories that
would be predicted, by the HOS, to be harder (i.e. molecular
biology, and biology and biochemistry) and two softer (i.e. plant
and animal sciences, and environment/ecology).
Figure 6. Bibliographic coupling networks, in Fruchterman-Reingold layout, with node size proportional to degree, and edge size
and colour reflecting weight (i.e. number of shared references between any two papers: blue =1; yellow= $2; red $5). Numbers
report average degree, modularity and average path length. Classification based on journal, following the systems of Essential Science Indicators and
Arts & Humanities Science Citation Index: ma = mathematics; sp = Space Science; ph= Physics; ch = Chemistry; mb = Molecular Biology; bb =
Biology & Biochemistry; pa = Plant and Animal Sciences; ee = Environment/Ecology; pp = Psychiatry/Psychology; eb = Economics & Business; so =
Social Sciences, general; ah = Arts & Humanities. High-resolution images available from the authors. [Data sourced from Thomson Reuters Web of
Knowledge].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066938.g006
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The likelihood of papers in each domain to share references was
measured with Exponential Random Graph Modelling, which
estimates the probability of a network configuration as a whole
[62,63]. ERGMs are the only technically correct way to test for
node-level predictors, because they take into account the non-
independence of links and other possible confounding factors.
Unfortunately, current algorithms are unable to incorporate
information on the weight of links (which in our case would
reflect the number of references shared between two papers). To
test for this latter factor, we separated the network in subsets based
on edge weight (from 1 to $10), and analysed the distribution of
edges separately. In each case, we assessed the likelihood of a node
(i.e. paper) to form a link of weight w (i.e. to share w references
with another paper) depending on its domain, and controlling for
each node’s number of references, overall number of edges and for
presence of triangle-effects (if paper x shares publications with y
and with z, then these latter are more likely to share references
with each other). The ERGM, estimated by maximum-pseudo-
likelihood, was specified as follows:
Network W~wð Þ~factor domainð Þz
covariate n:referencesð Þ
ztriangleszedges
Where W is edge weight (wM{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,.9}), domain and
references are attributes of nodes (i.e. of papers), and triangles and
edges are attributes of the network.
These analyses yield probability estimates and standard errors
analogous to those of a logistic regression, which were used to
produce the values and confidence intervals plotted in Figure 3A.
Regression analyses used a generalised linear model. Each
bibliographic parameter was assessed for its distribution, and was
either transformed to approach normality or, whenever possible,
tested untransformed, by adopting an appropriate link function.
Both the main and extended test included possible confounders as
independent co-variables whenever required, as specified in the
text. The general linear form of these regression models was
specified, for all parameters except the use of singular pronoun, as:
Y~azb1Mzb2BHzb3BSzb4Szb5Hzb6C
where Y is the parameter of interest, a is the intercept, C is an
eventual confounding variable and the remaining factors are
scientific domains (abbreviations as in figures), with physical
sciences as reference category. Confounding variables and
eventual weighting were added in some analyses, as specified in
the text.
The use of singular pronoun was assessed in its interaction term
with a dummy variable X, in a hierarchically well-formulated
model (i.e. a model in which all lower-order terms of an interaction
are included [64]).
Y~azb1Mzb2BHzb3BSzb4Szb5HzX
z b1Mzb2BHzb3BSzb4Szb5Hð Þ  X
Where X =21 for single-authored papers, and X = 1 for multiple
authored papers. The model was weighted by total number of
words in the abstract. Only the values of interaction terms are
reported in the text.
Multivariable analyses followed a reverse logic, and used ordinal
regression to test the ability of each parameter to predict the order
of disciplines. This method, technical similar to a logistic
regression, was chosen for its robustness and limited data
assumptions. We specified a generalized linear model with logit







where i is the rank of scientific domain (i.e. m,p,bs,bh,s,h)
and Xn are bibliometric parameters as specified in the text.
Network node data, i.e. the degree and intensity of sharing, was
included in regression models, treating values for each node as
independent. This obviously violates assumptions of indepen-
dence, a violation that leaves the magnitude and direction of
effects unaltered, but might lead to an underestimation of standard
errors – and therefore of statistical significance. Statistical
significance, however, is hardly an issue in this study, because
the statistical power is very high even for small effects. In a
univariate regression model, for example, we have over 99.9%
statistical power to detect effects of Cohen’s f2 as small as 0.001
[65]. This power can be appreciated in Figure 4, where the 95%
confidence intervals (all calculated as 1.96*standard error of mean)
are extremely narrow for most effects. What is really relevant in
these analyses, in other words, is not whether they pass a formal
0.05 statistical significance threshold, but whether these parame-
ters place disciplines in the predicted order, and how strong each
effect is. In any case, we assessed the robustness of results by
excluding network parameters.
All statistical analyses were performed with basic and specific
libraries from the open source package R [66,67,68]. Statistical
power was estimated with G*Power v. 3.1 [69]. The bibliographic
coupling network was created with purposely written Java code,
and network images and statistics were produced with the open
source software Gephi (v. 0.8 alpha) [70].
Results
With three minor exceptions, all bibliometric parameters placed
the biological sciences between the physical and the social, and
placed the biological-hard sciences before the biological-soft
(Figure 2). The mean number of authors peaked in the hard-
biological sciences, although the extreme values of this parameter
– in other words, the largest collaborations of all – followed the
trend predicted by the HOS. The use of first person showed some
discontinuity between the natural and social sciences for the
singular form, whilst for the plural form it showed greater
similarities between the biological and the social sciences than
would be expected under any hypothesis (Figure S1).
Bibliographic coupling parameters also generally supported the
HOS (Figure 3). The likelihood to share references with any other
paper in the network had intermediate values for the biological
sciences, both hard and soft. Moreover, whilst the physical sciences
were likely to share many references with fewer other papers, the
opposite was true for the social sciences (Figure 3A). This was
reflected in the structure of the network (Figure 3B), harder
domains having lower average degrees, lower density and greater
modularity, and softer ones progressively losing coherence
(Figure 3C). The pattern was only broken by the humanities
(Figure 3B, C).
Multiple regression analysis on individual parameters, which
controlled for possible confounding factors, generally confirmed
the above observations. All parameters placed the biological-hard
sciences between the physical and the biological-soft, and these
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latter before the social sciences or on a par with them, except for
the number of authors and for the use of first person plural
(Figure 4 and Table S1).
When tested together in a multiple ordinal regression model, the
main test was strongly supported: all parameters significantly
predicted the HOS, mostly with large effects (Table 2). Only
exception was the number of references, which had opposite sign
to what was predicted. This parameter, however, showed very
high colinearity (which was unsurprising, since most parameters in
the model are calculated from the reference list), and was therefore
removed from main effects and retained in the model only as
weighting factor. Predictions were substantially supported in the
extended test, too, although the magnitude of some effects was
reduced, and one parameter had its sign reversed (i.e. relative title
length) (Table 2). Surprisingly, Price’s index was amongst the
weakest predictors. As noted above, assumptions of independence
are violated by the network parameters. Removing these from the
model, however, did not change the results in any substantial way.
As explained in the introduction, we focused on broad domains
to keep predictions objective. However, when the 12 disciplines
were ordered following an intuitive notion of complexity, they still
showed smooth transitions for most parameters, particularly
amongst the natural sciences (Figure 5 and Figure S2). Refer-
ence-sharing networks showed the predicted gradual loss of
structure moving towards the social sciences, albeit with a possible
discontinuity amongst the soft-biological, and a peak in Psychia-
try/Psychology rather than in Social Sciences, General (Figure 6).
Discussion
We sampled nearly 30,000 papers from 12 disciplines and
measured a set of parameters that previous studies suggested
would reflect the level of scholarly consensus. In all but a few of the
tests, the biological sciences had values intermediate between those
of the physical and the social sciences, and putatively ‘‘softer’’
biological sciences fell in-between molecular-based biology and the
social sciences. If a natural vs. social, or a science vs. non-science
dichotomy were true, trends should have appeared discontinuous.
If neither theory were true, disciplines should have been
distributed randomly with respect to any characteristic – which,
given the number of parameters tested, was statistically the most
likely scenario. Therefore, these results strongly support the
Hierarchy of the Sciences, against alternative theories of scientific
knowledge.
Moving from mathematics to the humanities, or at least from
the physical to the social sciences, papers progressively tend to list
fewer co-authors, have longer texts, use less substantive titles, make
greater use of first person pronouns, and cite more references,
more books, older literature, and a higher diversity of sources.
Perhaps most important of all, papers show, collectively, a
proportional loss of cognitive structure and coherence in their
literature background: in the physical sciences, they share several
references with fewer other papers, as we expect if studies cluster
around clearly defined problems and methods; moving to the
biological and to the social sciences, papers are increasingly likely
to share common references randomly, which reflects the greater
freedom and flexibility with which scientists establish a cognitive
basis to their research (Figures 3 and 5).
What exactly causes these patterns is far from understood, and
we are prepared to discover that some of the assumptions behind
our empirical predictions are wrong – after all, quantitative studies
of science like this one are rather soft. Nonetheless, the data
unequivocally point to a ‘‘gradualist’’ view of the sciences, which
needs an explanation. A causal link between complexity of subject
matter and ability of scholars to reach consensus is the best
explanation we have.
Scientometric epistemological studies proceeding from prede-
fined subject-classification schemes run a risk of circularity, which
this study should have avoided. One could plausibly argue that the
Web of Science classification system is partly inspired by a HOS
prejudice. Categories such as ‘‘social sciences, general’’, for
example, could have been created around looser criteria, and
therefore might include a wider variety of journals compared to
traditional categories like ‘‘Space Science’’. This difference could
explain why we observe higher diversity and less coherence
amongst social sciences’ references. We believe this to be a possible
limitation for comparisons at the level of disciplines, but not for
broad domains, which are objective categories: the physical
sciences deal with non-biological phenomena, the social sciences
with human behaviour etc. Intriguingly, a previous study that
examined the distribution of methodologies in ESI disciplines
found greater variability amongst physical and biological disci-
plines, where many studies are actually behavioural [6]. So if any
flaws exist in the ESI classification, they probably played against
the HOS hypothesis.
Promoters of the ‘‘cultural’’ paradigm might still claim that we
only observed differences in cultural practices. They could
maintain, in particular, that researchers in, say, sociology simply
‘‘learn’’ to write longer papers, collaborate less, refer to older
literature etc. Even more subtly, critics might argue that consensus
in any particular discipline is achieved not because data ‘‘speak
clearly’’, but because sociological factors push researchers to
adhere to one paradigm despite contrary evidence. We do not
deny that disciplinary practices, including the ones measured here,
have strong cultural and generally non-cognitive components.
However, the most parsimonious explanation for our findings is
that such culturally transmitted practices are shaped, to some
extent, by objective constraints imposed by subject matter. This
follows from at least two considerations. First, some of the
parameters, in particular those extracted by bibliographic
coupling, represent collective phenomena, which are beyond the
conscious control of any individual actor. Second, as explained in
the introduction, a hierarchical view of science is much less
popular, nowadays, that a natural-social dichotomy: if anything,
many disciplines are criticised for succumbing to ‘‘physics envy’’ –
i.e. hopelessly striving to reach the accuracy, credibility and
prestige accorded to astronomy or quantum theory [71,72].
Therefore, if research practices were all arbitrary and culturally
imposed, then we would expect most disciplines to look,
superficially, like astrophysics. Interestingly, the parameter most
likely to reflect just stylistic conventions – the linguistic use of first
person pronouns – was the one most supportive of the two-cultures
hypothesis (Figure 2, Figure 4 and Table S1). We predict that
other non-cognitive parameters may also show natural-social
dichotomies.
Ignoring the relationship between scientific consensus and
subject matter’s complexity could be a costly mistake. Theory and
empirical evidence, for example, suggest that the frequency of false
positives and publication biases vary with the level of scholarly
consensus [6,73,74,75]. This would imply that claims made in
softer fields should be backed up by greater debate and replication
efforts before being accepted. This fact is often forgotten by the
media and policy makers, who at best discuss uncertainty on a
case-by-case basis. This fact also tends to be ignored by systems of
scientific publication and career advancement, which in all fields
tend to reward ‘‘pioneering’’ findings reported for the first time in
prestigious journals. Managing all sciences in the same way might
be a recipe for producing more false positives, biased findings, and
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scientific misconduct in softer fields [6,49,50]. It could be more
than a coincidence that physicist Jan Hendrik Scho¨n’s duplicated
graphs took less than a year to be discovered, whereas social
psychologist Diederik Stapel could fabricate his way through
20 years of star-level career, with no one ever challenging his work
[76,77]. Perhaps, soft sciences would progress more rapidly if their
practitioners were rewarded not based on immediacy and impact,
but on methodological transparency and successful replication
[78,79]. We emphasize that this argument does not refer
exclusively to the social sciences or humanities. Softer fields are
likely to be found, even if perhaps at lower frequencies, in the
physical and the biological sciences. Conversely, there is no reason
why high-consensus fields should not exist in the social sciences,
too.
This study conclusively proved a general pattern, the details and
the causes of which remain to be uncovered. Research should
clarify, in particular, how complexity of subject matter and other
field-specific factors affect research practices and scholarly
consensus. Already at the level of broad discipline categories, we
have made unexpected observations, with putatively harder fields
exhibiting soft-like characteristics. Reference-sharing patterns in
Psychiatry/Psychology or Plant and Animal Sciences, for example,
would suggest less cognitive coherence than for Environment/
Ecology or Economics & Business, respectively, despite the fact
that these latter study higher-order phenomena (Figure 6). It is
important to note, however, that the ESI classification for these
four disciplines combines pure and applied research, which might
represent an important confounding factor in our analyses [6].
Future progress might come from finer-grained empirical studies,
which compared fields using more refined classifications or even, if
at all possible, ranking the complexity of subject matters directly,
independent of any disciplinary connotation.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Frequency of first person plural pronouns in
abstracts, by scientific domain. Domains are attributed
based on journal, following the classifications of Essential Science
Indicators and Arts & Humanities Science Citation Index: m =
mathematics; p = physical sciences (Space Science + Physics +
Chemistry); bh = hard-biological disciplines (Molecular Biology +
Biology & Biochemistry); bs = soft-biological disciplines (Plant
and Animal Sciences + Environment/Ecology); s = social sciences
(Psychiatry/Psychology + Economics & Business + Social Sciences,
general); h = Humanities. [Data sourced from Thomson Reuters
Web of Knowledge].
(CORR)
Figure S2 Frequency of first person plural pronouns in
abstracts, by scientific domain. Domains are attributed
based on journal, following the classifications of Essential Science
Indicators and Arts & Humanities Science Citation Index: m =
mathematics; p = physical sciences (Space Science + Physics +
Chemistry); bh = hard-biological disciplines (Molecular Biology +
Biology & Biochemistry); bs = soft-biological disciplines (Plant
and Animal Sciences + Environment/Ecology); s = = social
sciences (Psychiatry/Psychology + Economics & Business + Social
Sciences, general); h = Humanities. [Data sourced from
Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge].
(CORR)
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